




There is no reason to replace the Razor with the Laser
Simon Thunder1 
Received: 11 August 2020 / Accepted: 5 March 2021 
© The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
In recent times it has become common to encounter philosophers who recommend 
the replacement of one principle concerning theory choice, Ockham’s Razor, with 
another: the Laser. Whilst the Razor tells us not to multiply entities beyond neces-
sity, the Laser tells us only to avoid multiplying fundamental entities beyond neces-
sity. There appear to be seven arguments in the literature for the Laser. They divide 
into three categories: arguments from the nature of non-fundamentality attempt to 
motivate the Laser by appeal to various observations about what it is to be non-
fundamental; arguments from cases describe hypothetical or actual cases, and allege 
that only the Laser accords with our intuitive judgements about them; and arguments 
from analogy claim that ontological parsimony is analogous to conceptual economy, 
and that this analogy recommends the Laser. I provide novel responses to each of 
the extant arguments for the Laser, and conclude that there is currently no good rea-
son for replacing the Razor with the Laser.
Keywords Ontological parsimony · Ockham’s Razor · The Razor · The Laser · 
Fundamentality · Simplicity
1 Introduction
It is common to encounter philosophers who recommend replacing one principle 
concerning theory choice, Ockham’s Razor:
OCKHAM’S RAZOR: Don’t multiply entities beyond necessity.
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with an alternative principle that Schaffer (2015) dubs the Laser:
THE LASER: (i) Don’t multiply fundamental entities without necessity, and
                       (ii) Multiply non-fundamental entities all you like.1
The Razor (as I’ll call it) and the Laser are associated with differing concep-
tions of what ontological parsimony (qua theoretical virtue) consists in: parsimony 
with respect to total ontology and parsimony with respect to fundamental ontology, 
respectively. Thus the Razor reflects the thought that it is theoretically advantageous 
to reduce the number of entities in one’s ontology as much as possible. The Laser 
instead reflects the thought that it is only theoretically advantageous to minimise 
the number of fundamental entities in one’s ontology, and that there is no theoreti-
cal advantage to be had in minimising the number of non-fundamental entities one 
posits.2
An impressive battery of arguments have been brought to bear in favour of 
accepting the Laser over the Razor. Broadly speaking, they divide into three cat-
egories. Arguments from the nature of non-fundamentality attempt to motivate the 
Laser by appeal to various observations about what it is to be non-fundamental. 
Arguments from cases describe hypothetical or actual cases, and allege that only the 
Laser accords with our intuitive judgements about them. Arguments from analogy 
claim that ontological parsimony is analogous to conceptual economy, and that this 
analogy recommends the Laser.
My aim in this paper is to argue that all of these arguments fail. In doing so, 
I’ll demonstrate that those antecedently sympathetic to the Razor have no reason to 
‘swap sides’ and accept the Laser instead.3 I begin with arguments from the nature 
of non-fundamentality.4
2 Philosophers sympathetic to the Laser include: Schaffer (2007: p. 189; 2009: p. 361; 2010a: p. 40; 
2010b: p. 313; 2012: pp. 87–89; 2015), Bennett (2017: §8.2.2), Cameron (2010: pp. 262–263), Korman 
(2015a: §4; 2015b: ch. 5 §3.2), and Sider (2013: p. 240).
3 Others have attempted to defend the Razor against some (though not all) of the arguments for the Laser 
that I consider here (see Baron and Tallant 2018, Fiddaman and Rodriguez-Pereyra 2018, Da Vee 2020). 
I here provide novel responses to every argument for the Laser that has been proposed in the literature. 
I’ll also note along the way why I take my responses to be preferable to extant ones.
4 I note that whilst I’ve characterised the Razor and the Laser as enjoining us to minimise the sheer num-
ber of (fundamental) entities posited, one might think that they are best understood as instead enjoining 
us to minimise the number of kinds of (fundamental) entity we posit. But this distinction is irrelevant 
to the extant arguments for replacing the Razor with the Laser. So, though I’ll generally stick with the 
characterisation of the two principles that I gave in the main text, I’ll assume that my discussion applies 
equally well to either characterisation.
1 Schaffer’s original formulation of the Laser omits (ii) (2015: p. 647). But (i) by itself is an implication 
of, rather than a rival to, the Razor (Baron and Tallant 2018: pp. 597–598). Adding (ii) (which is equiva-
lent to Baron and Tallant’s ‘Free Derivatives’ principle) fixes this, and is clearly what supporters of the 
Laser intended (see e.g. Bennett 2017: p. 220).
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2  Arguments from the nature of non‑fundamentality
Three supposed features of the nature of non-fundamentality have been cited in sup-
port of the Laser. Those features are: that the existence of non-fundamental entities 
is necessitated by that of the fundamental entities; that non-fundamental entities are 
in an important sense ontologically innocent; and that non-fundamental entities play 
no role in fundamental explanations. I’ll consider each such way of motivating the 
Laser in turn.
2.1  The argument from necessitation
Bennett proposes an argument for the Laser based on the observation that the exist-
ence of the non-fundamental entities is typically claimed to be necessitated by the 
existence (and nature) of the fundamental entities. She writes:
Let T− and T+ be two theories that agree on all fundamental matters. Accord-
ing to T− that’s all there is; according to T+, there are also a variety of non-
fundamental matters. My claim is that T+’s extra ontological commitments 
do not tell against its simplicity in a way that makes it less likely to be true 
[…]. The key point is that according to T+, its extra ontological commitments 
are necessitated by the fundamental matters. Thus T+’s statements about the 
non-fundamental matters NF are—by its lights—entailed by statements about 
the fundamental matters F. And the following is a theorem of the probability 
calculus:
if A ˫ B, Pr(A) = Pr(A&B).
It follows that according to T+, the probability of F is the same as the prob-
ability of F and NF. This means that—again according to T+–T+ is exactly as 
likely as T−.
(2017: 223, emphasis original).
Bennett concludes from this that adding non-fundamental posits to a theory does 
not make that theory any less likely to be true (as long as the theory says that these 
posits are necessitated by the fundamental entities already posited) (2017: p. 225). 
On the innocuous assumption that theoretical virtues are those the possession of 
which makes a theory ceteris paribus more likely to be true, Bennett’s argument 
would, if successful, establish that we should take the relevant theoretical virtue to 
be parsimony qua minimising only fundamental entities, rather than parsimony qua 
minimising entities simpliciter. This is in line with the Laser, not the Razor.5
5 It’s worth noting a minor quibble immediately. Bennett’s argument moves from the claim that (by T+’s 
lights) F necessitates NF, to the claim that (by T+’s lights) sentences about F logically entail sentences 
about NF, in order to use the principle of the probability calculus that she identifies to argue that (by 
T+’s lights) the probability of F and is equivalent to that of F alone. But presumably theories of the non-
fundamental, including T+, think that the kind of necessitation holding between F and NF is merely met-
aphysical rather than logical necessitation—few theories regard it as logically contradictory to accept F 
but deny NF. So Bennett’s argument really relies on a different principle to the one she identifies, namely:
 (*) If A metaphysically necessitates B, then Pr(A) = Pr(A&B)
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The problem with Bennett’s argument is that it misconstrues what the probability 
calculus tells us about how entailment claims affect probability.6 Consider again the 
theorem that Bennett cites:
if A ˫ B, then Pr(A) = Pr(A&B).
In order to use this theorem in support of the Laser, we’d have to read it as telling 
us to disregard the effect of an entailed claim on the probability of the theory that 
entails it. For only then could we conclude from T+’s supposition that the existence 
of NF is entailed by the existence of F that the inclusion of NF in T+’s ontology has 
no negative impact on the probability that that ontology is correct. But the above 
principle does not tell us to disregard the effect of an entailed claim on the prob-
ability of the theory that entails it. If it did, then we wouldn’t be able to use the fact 
that a theory entails a contradiction as a reason to assign that theory a probability 
of 0, which is absurd. Rather, what the above principle tells us is that, if A entails 
B, then when a theory accepts A it is thereby incurring any negative impact on its 
probability associated with accepting B. Thus, for example, if A entails B, and B is a 
contradiction, then accepting A reduces the probability of a theory to 0 (even if that 
theory doesn’t explicitly accept B).
In our case, the above principle does not allow us to reason that, since T+ 
already claims that F exists and that F’s existence entails NF’s existence, any nega-
tive impact on the probability of T+’s ontology that would otherwise be associated 
with positing NF can be disregarded. Rather, it tells us only that, given T+’s claim 
that the existence of F entails the existence of NF, any negative (or indeed positive) 
impact on the probability of T+’s ontology associated with positing NF was already 
incurred when T+ posited F. This is entirely consistent with there being (ceteris 
paribus) a negative impact on the probability of T+’s ontology associated with pos-
iting NF, which is all that supporters of the Razor must claim here.
So, specifically, here is what supporters of the Razor should say about Bennett’s 
case. Initially, our evidence suggests that we should assign a certain probability, say 
0.7, to the claim that F exists. If we then discover, in line with T+, that F necessi-
tates NF, what we have discovered is that positing F brings with it commitment to 
further entities than we previously thought. Since, in line with the Razor, we think 
that (ceteris paribus) extra ontological commitments lower the probability of a the-
ory’s truth, we should now in turn think that (ceteris paribus) the claim that F exists 
is less probable than we previously thought. On the other hand, if we decide, in line 
Footnote 5 (continued)
 The reason that this is only a minor quibble is that (*) seems just as plausible as the principle Bennett 
identifies. So for ease of presentation I’ll stick with the principle as Bennett formulates it, on the under-
standing that strictly speaking (*) ought to be substituted in its place. Thanks to two anonymous referees 
for discussion.
6 Da Vee instead objects to how Bennett allegedly assesses all probabilities by the lights of T+ (2020: 
pp. 3684–3685). But Bennett doesn’t assess all probabilities by the lights of T+: her argument relies only 
on assuming  T+’s claim that F necessitates NF when calculating the probability of  T+’s postulation of 
NF. I lack the space to pursue the point, but suffice it to say that it’s not clear to me that Bennett is doing 
anything illicit here. At any rate, my objection to Bennett is distinct from Da Vee’s.
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with T−, that F does not necessitate NF, then we have no reason to revise down the 
probability that we originally assigned to the claim that F exists. That is, given the 
Razor, the claim that F exists receives a different probability assignment depending 
on whether it is taken to require positing NF or not. This is perfectly consistent with 
the probability calculus, since it doesn’t involve any violation of the claim that if 
F necessitates NF then Pr(F) = Pr(F&NF): what supporters of the Razor are saying 
here is that if F doesn’t necessitate NF then Pr(F) = 0.7, but if F does necessitate NF 
then Pr(F) = Pr(F&NF) = n for some n < 0.7. In this way supporters of the Razor can 
maintain their claim that T+’s commitment to NF has a negative impact on the prob-
ability of its truth in comparison to that of T−.
In general, it is consistent with the probability calculus to regard extra non-fun-
damental posits as (ceteris paribus) having a negative impact on a theory’s prob-
ability, as the Razor implies. This is true even if non-fundamental posits are neces-
sitated by the fundamental ones. Thus Bennett’s argument from necessitation does 
not succeed.
2.2  The argument from ontological innocence
Bennett also thinks the alleged ontological innocence of non-fundamental entities 
provides support for the Laser (2017: pp. 221–223). Her thought is this. Whilst it’s 
not unusual to hear philosophers’ (such as Lewis, 1991: p. 81) claiming non-fun-
damental entities to be ontologically innocent [or, equivalently, an ontological free 
lunch (Armstrong, 1989: p. 56), or nothing over and above the fundamental enti-
ties, etc.], it’s not obvious how we can make sense of this idea, especially given that 
non-fundamental entities are not generally taken to be identical to fundamental enti-
ties. But we apparently can explain this if we accept the Laser: claiming that non-
fundamental posits don’t count against a theory’s parsimony in the way that matters 
for theory choice arguably captures and explains the sense in which those posits are 
ontologically innocent. This is a point in favour of the Laser.
But the argument from ontological innocence is unsuccessful, because there’s a 
way of capturing the thought that non-fundamental entities are ontologically inno-
cent that doesn’t require accepting the Laser.7 For, as Hawley notes (2014: §2), 
another way to secure the ontological innocence of the non-fundamental is to say 
that commitment to the fundamental entities automatically carries with it commit-
ment to the non-fundamental entities. Non-fundamental entities would then be onto-
logically innocent in the sense that explicitly committing oneself to them doesn’t 
add to one’s ontological commitments at all (as commitment to them was already 
implicit in prior commitment to the fundamental entities). As I argued in the previ-
ous section, this is consistent with the thought that commitment to non-fundamental 
entities nonetheless still counts against the probability of a theory’s truth, and is thus 
7 Da Vee instead objects to Bennett’s argument here by rejecting that non-fundamental entities are onto-
logically innocent in the first place (2020: p. 3684). My response to Bennett has the advantage of remain-
ing neutral as to whether non-fundamental entities are ontologically innocent or not.
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consistent with the Razor. So the ontological innocence of the non-fundamental 
doesn’t give us any reason to abandon the Razor.
2.3  The argument from explanation
Korman argues that the relationship between (non-)fundamentality and explanation 
provides us with an argument for the Laser. He presents his argument as follows:
The most parsimonious theory is the one that explains all that needs to be 
explained using the fewest resources. Since fundamental objects are those in 
terms of which everything is explained, it only makes sense to measure onto-
logical parsimony in terms of which items are taken to be fundamental.
(2015a: p. 306; repeated in 2015b: pp. 75–76).
Now, taken at face value, this argument is invalid. If the most parsimonious theory 
is the one that explains all that needs to be explained using the fewest resources, 
and if we can explain everything that needs to be explained by appealing only to 
fundamental objects, then what follows is not that our measure of parsimony should 
be blind to non-fundamental entities, but rather that the most parsimonious theory 
is the one that eliminates all non-fundamental objects (for on those assumptions, 
any theory that posits non-fundamental entities in addition to fundamental ones will 
explain nothing more but will posit more resources than a theory that posits only the 
fundamental entities). This conclusion is consistent with the Razor.
But immediately after the passage quoted above, Korman writes, ‘the mere fact 
that a theory’s fundamental mode of being is enjoyed by a wide range of objects is 
no strike against the parsimoniousness of that theory, since one need not suppose 
that those objects themselves all enter into fundamental explanations’ (2015a: p. 
306; 2015b: p. 76; emphasis mine). With this in mind, I think we should take Kor-
man to be arguing as follows:
1. The most parsimonious theory is the one whose fundamental explanations explain 
all that needs to be explained using the fewest resources.
2. Fundamental objects are those in terms of which everything is fundamentally 
explained.
3. So we should measure ontological parsimony in terms of which items are taken 
to be fundamental.
(1)–(3) is a valid argument for the Laser. But are (1) and (2) true?
To answer, we need to know what a fundamental explanation is. Unfortunately, 
Korman doesn’t provide an explicit definition of this notion. But a clarification of 
what he means by it might be implicit in what he says about what it is for an object 
(or an ‘item’) to be fundamental:
The basic idea is that an item’s fundamentality should be a function of the way 
in which it features in metaphysical explanations. [… We] could say that (i) 
A is fundamental simpliciter iff it features in facts that do not obtain in virtue 
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of any other facts, and (ii) A is more fundamental than B if some B-involv-
ing facts obtain partly or wholly in virtue of A-involving facts and never vice 
versa.
(2015a: p. 305; repeated in 2015b: p. 73).
This is suggestive of the following definition:
FUNDAMENTAL EXPLANATION: p is a fundamental explanation = df p is a 
fact in virtue of which at least one further fact obtains but which does not itself 
obtain in virtue of other facts.
The problem is, if (1) and (2) are read as employing the notion of a fundamental 
explanation at issue in FUNDAMENTAL EXPLANATION then Korman’s argu-
ment becomes question-begging against supporters of the Razor.8 For, as is clear 
from the above quotation, Korman takes it to be definitive of what it is for an item 
to be fundamental that that item features in facts that do not obtain in virtue of any 
other facts. But given FUNDAMENTAL EXPLANATION, every fundamental 
explanation is a fact that does not obtain in virtue of any other facts. It follows that, 
by definition, fundamental explanations only make reference to fundamental entities. 
So (1) in the argument above is equivalent to:
(1*) The most parsimonious theory is the one whose explanations that only make 
reference to fundamental entities explain all that needs to be explained using the 
fewest resources.
‘Resources’ as it appears in (1*) can only mean fundamental resources; only those 
antecedently sympathetic to the Laser will agree that parsimony is a matter of reduc-
ing the numbers of only those resources, as opposed to all resources, including non-
fundamental ones.
Perhaps Korman could attempt to make his argument non-question-begging by 
continuing to accept FUNDAMENTAL EXPLANATION but divorcing the defini-
tion of a fundamental entity from that of a fundamental explanation.9 That would 
prevent it from being analytic that a fundamental explanation is one that only fea-
tures fundamental entities, and so would block the analytic equivalence between (1) 
and the question-begging (1*).
But it’s still not clear this would prevent the argument from begging the ques-
tion against those who don’t antecedently accept the Laser; at the very least, (1) still 
seems unmotivated without a background commitment to the Laser. For what rea-
sons have we been given for thinking that parsimony only concerns minimising the 
8 Da Vee shares my concern that Korman’s argument is question-begging (though he doesn’t spell out 
why)—see his (2020: pp. 3690–3691).
9 For example, perhaps Korman could regard what it is to be a fundamental entity as primitive, à la Wil-
son (2014: p. 560), or alternatively take fundamental entities to be those that are not grounded by any-
thing else, à la Schaffer (2009: p. 373, 2010a: p. 38) (though to avoid begging the question he would then 




amount of resources required for fundamental explanations, rather than all explana-
tions? Those attracted to the Razor will presumably be inclined to think that con-
siderations of parsimony pressure us to instead eliminate non-fundamental explana-
tions and the non-fundamental entities they make reference to. Nothing Korman has 
said motivates thinking otherwise. I conclude that his argument from explanation for 
the Laser does not succeed.
3  Arguments from cases
I turn now to two attempts to motivate the Laser by appealing to hypothetical or 
real-world cases.
3.1  The argument from the case of Esther and Feng
Schaffer asks us to consider the following case. Suppose that Esther formulates a 
scientific theory according to which there are 100 types of fundamental particle, and 
that her theory is widely accepted. Then:
Feng comes along and – in a moment of genius – builds on Esther’s work to 
discover a deeper fundamental theory with 10 types of fundamental string, 
which in varying combinations make up Esther’s 100 types of particle. This is 
intended to be a paradigm case of scientific progress in which a deeper, more 
unified, and more elegant theory ought to replace a shallower, less unified, and 
less elegant theory. Feng’s theory is evidently better in every relevant meth-
odological respect.
(2015: p. 648)
This, says Schaffer, tells in favour of the Laser. For given the Razor, there is 
apparently at least one respect in which Feng’s theory is not better than Esther’s: 
since Feng posits everything Esther posits plus the additional strings, Feng’s theory 
would apparently be disfavoured by the Razor, all else being equal. The Laser, on 
the other hand, correctly favours Feng’s theory for its smaller fundamental ontology. 
As Schaffer has it:
‘So, by the lights of The Razor, Feng’s theory is an affront to ontological econ-
omy for positing these additional strings. It is to be strongly dispreferred, all 
else equal. This is obviously backwards, as far as sound methodological coun-
sel is concerned.
Feng’s theory is obviously no affront to ontological economy, but – when 
judged purely by the methodological virtues – is evidently a more economical, 
tighter, and more unified improvement. It is The Laser that gets this right.’
(648)
In response, others have pointed out that it’s consistent with the Razor to think 
that Feng’s theory is superior to Esther’s all things considered, because Feng’s 
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theory secures other, weightier theoretical virtues such as explanatory power and 
theoretical unification (Baron & Tallant, 2018: p. 599; Da Vee, 2020: p. 3681; Fid-
daman & Rodriguez-Pereyra, 2018: p. 343). This is all well and good, but it leaves 
the door open to Schaffer to rejoin by insisting again that his intuition in this case is 
that Feng’s theory is ‘obviously no affront to ontological parsimony’, not merely that 
Feng’s theory is all things considered superior to Esther’s. Pointing to the greater 
explanatory power (etc.) of Feng’s theory over Esther’s does nothing to show how 
that Razor is consistent with this intuition. Absent some reason for thinking that 
Schaffer’s intuition can safely be discounted here, it’s not clear that this line of 
response to Schaffer’s argument for the Laser from the case of Esther and Feng is 
successful.
Instead, supporters of the Razor should offer a way of explaining away the intui-
tion that Feng’s theory is ‘no affront to ontological parsimony’ that doesn’t require 
accepting that ontological parsimony is blind to non-fundamental ontology. They 
should say that that intuition is instead generated by the perception, created by 
Schaffer’s description of the case, that Feng’s theory is true, or at least correct in 
positing the extra layer of fundamental entities below the entities that Esther posits. 
Schaffer says a number of things to encourage this perception: he describes Feng’s 
formulation of his theory as a ‘moment of genius’, and the theory itself as a ‘deeper 
fundamental theory’ in comparison to Esther’s; most tellingly, he says that Feng’s 
building upon Esther’s theory to propose his own ‘is intended to be a paradigm 
case of scientific progress’ (2015: p. 648). To be clear, I don’t say that Schaffer’s 
description of the case of Esther and Feng is logically inconsistent with the idea that 
Esther’s theory might be true after all (so e.g. it is probably consistent—though a bit 
odd—to describe Feng’s replacement of Esther’s theory with his own as a ‘moment 
of genius’ even though Esther’s theory is true): my point is just that it’s easy and 
natural to read what Schaffer says and assume that in the universe he describes 
Feng is right to say that there is an extra layer of entities below the ones that Esther 
posited. And if we do read Schaffer in this way, then we have a way of explaining 
the intuition that Feng’s theory is no affront to ontological parsimony that doesn’t 
require swapping the Razor for the Laser. For the Razor only tells us to avoid posit-
ing unnecessary entities. But if we assume that the extra entities that Feng posits 
exist, then we must also accept that it was necessary to posit them. Thus Feng’s the-
ory doesn’t offend against the Razor at all, since it doesn’t multiply entities beyond 
necessity. So on the assumption that, in the universe that Schaffer describes, Feng’s 
extra entities really do exist, we can hold on to the Razor whilst agreeing that Feng’s 
theory is no affront to ontological parsimony.
Schaffer might reply that the implication that Feng’s theory is true is a red her-
ring, and that the Razor would get the wrong result in an analogous case to that of 
Esther and Feng that doesn’t smuggle in or encourage the assumption that Feng’s 
theory is true. But it seems to me that the presumed truth of Feng’s theory is pre-
cisely what drives the intuition that Feng’s theory is no affront to ontological par-
simony, at least to those not independently drawn to the Laser. Strip away all the 
admiring language with which Schaffer describes Feng’s theory, and what we are left 
with is a case in which we have two theories, T1 and T2, where T1 posits 100 fun-
damental entities, and T2 posits 10 fundamental entities and 100 non-fundamental 
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entities. Nothing about this case seems to add anything to dialectic: those who find 
the Laser independently plausible will judge that T2 is ontologically simpler in the 
way that matters, those who find the Razor independently plausible will judge that 
T1 is ontologically simpler in the way that matters, and undecided parties will con-
tinue to be undecided, having been given no reason to make up their minds one way 
or the other. What was apparently so compelling about Schaffer’s original argument 
was that even those not antecedently sympathetic to the Laser (including those who 
find the Razor independently plausible) were likely to have the intuition that Feng’s 
theory is no affront to ontological parsimony, and to the extent that this intuition was 
suggestive of the Laser, everyone therefore had a reason to be attracted to the Laser. 
But once we strip away the confounding assumption that Feng’s theory is correct 
in positing its extra layer of fundamental entities below those of Esther’s, those not 
antecedently sympathetic to the Laser are no likelier than they were before consider-
ing the case of Esther and Feng to have the pro-Laser intuition.
So, in sum: either the case of Esther and Feng is described in such a way as to 
encourage the assumption that Feng’s extra entities really do exist, in which case 
the Razor agrees with Schaffer’s intuition that Feng’s extra entities are no affront 
to ontological parsimony, or it is described without this implication, in which case 
only those who already find the Laser plausible on independent grounds will think 
that the Razor is wrong to regard Feng’s extra entities as genuine (though outweigh-
able) costs of his theory. Either way, the argument from the case of Esther and Feng 
doesn’t give us any reason to abandon the Razor for the Laser.10
3.2  The argument from a Bias Towards the Built
Bennett claims that a commitment to the Laser is latent in actual scientific practice 
(2017: pp. 220–221).11 In particular, she argues that we are implicitly attracted to 
a scientific methodology that includes a bias towards the built. For Bennett, to be 
built is to be non-fundamental, and so a bias towards the built is the bias in favour 
of claiming entities in our ontology to be non-fundamental, rather than fundamen-
tal. Such a bias would suggest an implicit preference on our part for the Laser over 
the Razor, as only the Laser is consistent with the thought that there is theoretical 
advantage to be had in shifting ontological commitments away from our fundamen-
tal ontology—thereby minimising the amount of fundamental entities we posit—
and into our non-fundamental ontology.
10 Thanks to two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments here.
11 In the same discussion, Bennett also describes the following hypothetical case. Suppose that T1 and 
T2 agree on what entities there are, but that whereas T1 regards all of those entities as fundamental, T2 
claims that some are derivative of the others. ‘Surely’, says Bennett, ‘the second theory is simpler in the 
way that matters’ (2017: p. 221). But if this is to be treated as an argument for the Laser in its own right, 
then it is unconvincing. Suppose T1 and T2 both posit 100 quarks, that T1 says that all the quarks are 
fundamental, but that T2 says that 99 of the quarks are derivative of the remaining one. At the very least, 
it’s not obvious that T2 is the superior theory here; indeed, my intuition is that T1 is clearly preferable to 
T2, and that there’s no pressure from parsimony to say otherwise.
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Is it plausible that a bias towards the built is implicit in scientific methodology? 
Bennett provides the following motivation for thinking so:
[… W]e all think that things ought to be explained wherever possible. We don’t 
rest content believing in water; we want to know what water is made of, and 
how exactly those components come together to behave as water does. This 
is what drives science: we want to account for some things in terms of other 
things. All else equal, we prefer things to be built. Indeed, we prefer things to 
be built from components to which we are already committed. When scientists 
are faced with some interesting new phenomenon, they first try to explain it in 
terms of things they already believe in. Of course, they may eventually have to 
posit some new fundamental entity or force to explain it, or may even have to 
accept the phenomenon as itself fundamental. But that is a last resort […] All 
this is to say that we have a bias towards the built.
(2017: p. 221)
To evaluate this, we need to know what ‘phenomenon’ means. On one plausible 
interpretation, ‘phenomenon’ means something like empirical data. On this read-
ing it is plausible that scientists do indeed try to  explain new phenomena ‘in terms 
of things they already believe in’, but this fact is suggestive only of a bias on the 
part of scientists against unnecessarily positing new entities, fundamental or not, 
rather than of a bias towards the built. This is consistent with the Razor. So Bennett 
must be using ‘phenomenon’ to mean something like object or process or event, 
such that accepting the phenomenon as genuine or real (as opposed to illusory) is 
equivalent to accepting ontological commitment to that phenomenon. Then a bias 
towards explaining new phenomena in terms of entities that are already in our ontol-
ogy would amount to a bias towards the built (as long as the sort of explanation at 
issue is metaphysical explanation, since saying that a phenomenon is built or non-
fundamental is to say that it is metaphysically explained by the entities of which it is 
derivative12).
But on this reading of ‘phenomenon’, we don’t have any reason to think that sci-
entists have a generalised preference for saying that new phenomena are (metaphysi-
cally) explained by other entities already in their ontology. First, whilst it’s true that 
scientists in general ‘don’t rest content’ simply believing in a given phenomenon, 
and rather try to find out what it is made of, this is evidence only of the fact that sci-
entists want to find out whether a given phenomenon is built out of smaller compo-
nents, rather than that they are antecedently inclined to believe that the phenomenon 
is built out of smaller components (compare: a scientist who attempts to discover 
whether some particle is charged or not need not have a ‘bias towards the charged’). 
Further, in cases in which it does seem plausible that scientists would intuitively 
prefer to regard the new phenomenon as built out of smaller components, we can 
explain this preference without appeal to a general bias towards the built. Whilst 
a scientist who (for example) discovers water for the first time may well prefer a 
12 See Bennett (2017: §3.4).
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theory that predicts that water is made up of smaller components, this seems likely 
to be because experience has taught her that macroscopic phenomena have in the 
past always turned out to be made from smaller particles (perhaps accompanied by 
the intuition that macroscopic extended simples are inherently dubious). Absent a 
case in which such considerations don’t plausibly explain a scientist’s preference for 
regarding the new phenomenon in question as probably built out of smaller compo-
nents, we don’t have a good reason for agreeing with Bennett that scientists (or we) 
have an implicit bias towards the built.
So I don’t think that Bennett’s appeal to actual scientific practice demonstrates 
that we have a bias towards the built, and so I don’t think her argument from a bias 
towards the built for the Laser  succeeds.
4  Arguments from analogy
Schaffer (2015: §§4–5) offers two arguments for the Laser based on an alleged anal-
ogy between ontological parsimony and conceptual economy, which concerns the 
minimisation of concepts invoked by a theory.
4.1  The Argument from the Conceptual Laser
Schaffer’s first argument from analogy with conceptual economy is the most direct. 
He begins (2015: p. 649) by asking us to consider two candidate principles concern-
ing conceptual economy:
THE CONCEPTUAL RAZOR: Do not invoke concepts without necessity.
THE CONCEPTUAL LASER:  (i)  Do not invoke primitive concepts without 
necessity.
                                                   (ii)  Multiply non-primitive concepts all you 
like.13
Each principle is suggestive of a different way of measuring conceptual economy. 
The Conceptual Razor suggests that conceptual economy consists in minimising 
total number of concepts; the Conceptual Laser suggests that conceptual economy 
consists in minimising the total number of primitive concepts, and that multiply-
ing the number of defined (aka derivative) concepts invoked doesn’t count against a 
theory’s conceptual economy at all.
Schaffer thinks that it’s defeasibly reasonable to suppose that conceptual econ-
omy and ontological parsimony are analogous, and thus that ‘it is defeasibly rea-
sonable to expect that the apt measures of economy will be parallel’ between con-
ceptual economy and ontological parsimony (p. 649). Since primitive concepts 
appear analogous to fundamental entities, and defined concepts appear analogous 
13 Though Schaffer’s formulation of the Conceptual Laser omits (ii), he clearly intends the Conceptual 
Laser to be committed to it.
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to non-fundamental/derivative entities, the Conceptual Razor appears to be directly 
analogous to the (i.e. Ockham’s) Razor whilst the Conceptual Laser appears to be 
directly analogous to the Laser. Further, Schaffer thinks that the Conceptual Laser 
is the right measure of conceptual economy, arguing that only the Conceptual Laser 
is consistent with our intuitions in various cases he cites (pp. 649–651). By analogy, 
then, he concludes that the Laser is the right measure of ontological parsimony.
Now, to be clear, if conceptual economy is to be analogous to ontological parsi-
mony in a way that might support the inference from the Conceptual Laser to the 
Laser, then we must understand conceptual economy as being truth conducive (as 
opposed to e.g. merely making for more aesthetically pleasing or pragmatically use-
ful theories). The Razor and the Laser are supposed to imply that theories that do 
not multiply entities (or fundamental entities) beyond necessity are, all else equal, 
more likely to be true than more ontologically profligate theories. If the Conceptual 
Razor and the Conceptual Laser are to be analogous to these principles, then we 
must understand them as implying that theories that do not multiply concepts (or 
primitive concepts) beyond necessity are, all else equal, more likely to be true than 
more conceptually profligate theories.
With this in mind, I think Schaffer is right to say that the Conceptual Laser is the 
correct measure of conceptual economy, but wrong to conclude from this that the 
Laser is by analogy the correct measure of ontological parsimony.14 Indeed, I think 
that examination of the reason why the Conceptual Laser is the correct measure of 
conceptual economy reveals a crucial disanalogy between conceptual economy and 
ontological parsimony, which suffices to block the conclusion that the Laser is the 
correct measure of ontological parsimony.15
First, then, the reason we should endorse the Conceptual Laser has to do with the 
way in which defined concepts are eliminable from the theories that employ them, in 
the following sense: for any theory  Td that employs defined concepts d1, …, dn that 
it defines in terms of primitive concepts p1, …, pn, there is a theory  Tp that is equiva-
lent to  Td but that replaces each di of  Td with its definiens, and that thus employs 
only p1, …, pn. This much follows from the nature of a definition, which guarantees 
that we can always preserve meaning (and certainly truth) by replacing an instance 
of a definiendum with an instance of its definiens. For example, suppose that T1 says 
that objects a and b overlap, and defines ‘overlap’ in terms of the primitive concept 
14 Thus I disagree with Baron and Tallant (2018: pp. 600–601), who object to Schaffer’s arguments for 
the Conceptual Laser and deny that this principle is the right measure of conceptual economy in the first 
place. At any rate, whatever the merits of their objections to Schaffer’s arguments for the Conceptual 
Laser, they don’t undermine the argument that I provide below in support of the Conceptual Laser.
15 Fiddaman and Rodriguez-Pereyra adopt a similar line of argument (2018: p. 346) but fill in the details 
wrong. They claim that the motivation for the Conceptual Laser is that theories with fewer primitive con-
cepts are more intelligible to an ideally intelligent person (whilst the number of derivative concepts a the-
ory contains doesn’t affect this sort of intelligibility at all), and that this motivation doesn’t carry across 
to the case of ontological parsimony. But on the assumption that conceptual economy is truth condu-
cive, it’s dubious that considerations of intelligibility can motivate any particular measure of conceptual 
economy, because it’s dubious that theories that are more intelligible are more likely to be true. Suppose 
otherwise. Then, since equivalent theories can apparently differ with regard to intelligibility, equivalent 
theories can differ with regard to the probability that they are true, which is impossible.
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of parthood, in the usual way: then there is an equivalent theory, T2, that makes no 
mention of overlap, and that instead says only that a and b have a part in common.
Now assume for reductio that defined concepts count against a theory’s con-
ceptual economy. Then T1 is less conceptually economical than T2, because T1 
employs both parthood and overlap, whilst T2 employs only parthood. So T1 is less 
likely to be true than T2. But T1 and T2 are equivalent. So T1 and T2 must be 
equally likely to be true. Contradiction. So defined concepts do not count against 
a theory’s conceptual economy. That means that the Conceptual Laser is the right 
measure of conceptual economy (cf. Cowling, 2013: p. 3893).
In general, since we can always reformulate a theory that employs defined con-
cepts in addition to primitive concepts so that that it only employs its primitive con-
cepts, without changing the meaning or probability of truth of that theory, it makes 
sense to ignore the defined concepts when measuring conceptual economy.
The reason that conceptual economy and ontological parsimony are crucially dis-
analogous, then, is that that same motivation doesn’t carry across to the ontological 
case, because non-fundamental ontological commitments are not eliminable in the 
requisite sense.16 That is, we cannot ‘reformulate’ a theory that contains ontologi-
cal commitment to both fundamental and non-fundamental entities in such a way as 
to remove all ontological commitment to non-fundamental entities without thereby 
changing the meaning of the theory. For example, suppose we start with a theory 
that posits both fundamental simples and some non-fundamental mereological 
fusions of those simples; then suppose we strip away from that theory all ontological 
commitment to the non-fundamental mereological fusions, reformulating it so that 
any sentence implying the existence of a composite F is replaced with a sentence 
instead implying the existence only of simples arranged F-wise. The result of this 
would be a theory distinct from (i.e. non-equivalent to) the one we started with, for 
the theory we’d end up with would be consistent with mereological nihilism, whilst 
the one we started with was not. The non-fundamental fusions that our original the-
ory posited, then, were not eliminable in the requisite sense, and so we cannot infer 
that they shouldn’t count against a theory’s ontological parsimony.
To sum up, then: the very consideration that warrants ignoring defined con-
cepts when calculating a theory’s conceptual economy, namely the eliminability of 
defined concepts, does not apply in the case ontological parsimony, for non-funda-
mental entities are not eliminable in the requisite sense. In this way, ontological par-
simony is importantly disanalogous to conceptual economy. As such, there are no 
grounds for inferring from the fact that the Conceptual Laser is the right measure of 
conceptual economy that the Laser is the right measure of ontological parsimony.
4.2  The Argument from Bang for the Buck
Schaffer (2015: pp. 651–653) proposes a further argument for the Laser from anal-
ogy with conceptual economy. His argument takes as its starting point the thought 
16 See also Da Vee (2020: pp. 3682–3683) for a different way of arguing that conceptual economy and 
ontological parsimony are disanalogous.
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that ontological parsimony is relevant to theory choice only insofar as it is relevant 
to the question of how much bang for the buck a theory secures. The best theories 
are those that, ceteris paribus, find the best balance between minimising their buck 
whilst maximising their bang. Schaffer thinks that the right formulation of the prin-
ciple of ‘bang for the buck’ that concerns ontology is:
ONTOLOGICAL BANG FOR THE BUCK: Optimally balance minimisation 
of fundamental entities with maximisation of derivative entities (especially 
useful ones).
ONTOLOGICAL BANG FOR THE BUCK plainly recommends the Laser over the 
Razor, as only the Laser is consistent with the injunction to minimise fundamental 
posits whilst maximising non-fundamental ones. Given this, it’s clear that no-one 
who isn’t antecedently attracted to the Laser will find ONTOLOGICAL BANG FOR 
THE BUCK independently plausible. But Schaffer thinks that this principle is well-
motivated by the fact that conceptual economy and ontological parsimony are analo-
gous, and the following principle concerning conceptual economy is correct:
CONCEPTUAL BANG FOR THE BUCK: Optimally balance minimisation of 
primitive concepts with the maximisation of defined concepts (especially use-
ful ones).
This time we need not dispute that conceptual economy and ontological parsimony 
are analogous in the way that Schaffer needs them to be to support his argument. 
For CONCEPTUAL BANG FOR THE BUCK cannot be correct in the first place: it 
cannot be that, ceteris paribus, theories are more likely to be true if they optimally 
balance minimisation of primitive concepts with the maximisation of defined con-
cepts (especially useful ones). The reason for this has to do again with the notion 
that defined concepts are eliminable from the theories that employ them. Consider 
T3, a theory that uses a mixture of primitive concepts and defined concepts, and T4, 
which is the result of reformulating T3 so as to replace its defined concepts with 
combinations of its primitive ones. As I argued in the previous section, the nature of 
definition means that T3 and T4 are equivalent. But CONCEPTUAL BANG FOR 
THE BUCK says that T3 is superior to—i.e. more likely to be true than—T4. This 
is a contradiction, so CONCEPTUAL BANG FOR THE BUCK must be false. Thus 
Schaffer’s argument from this principle for ONTOLOGICAL BANG FOR THE 
BUCK, and therefore for the Laser, fails.17
17 Da Vee (2020: p. 3683) also rejects CONCEPTUAL BANG FOR THE BUCK, but does so because 
he thinks that useless defined concepts shouldn’t be considered as part of the conceptual ‘bang’ of a 
theory. But the usefulness or otherwise of defined concepts is irrelevant, given my argument: defined 




I’ve examined all seven arguments for replacing the Razor with the Laser that appear 
in the literature: three that appeal to various facets of the nature of non-fundamen-
tality, two that appeal to hypothetical or real-world cases, and two that appeal to an 
alleged analogy with conceptual economy. I’ve argued that none of these arguments 
for the Laser succeed.
In closing, it is worth considering a final way of trying to justify accepting the 
Laser over the Razor, one that doesn’t appeal to any argument that has the Laser as 
its conclusion: perhaps those who support the Laser can simply maintain that they 
find the idea that non-fundamental ontological posits do not count against the onto-
logical simplicity of a theory directly intuitively plausible. Indeed, the very fact that 
there are so many philosophers offering arguments for the Laser may be taken to be 
suggestive of the prevalence of this intuition.18 It would help to shore up the defence 
of the Razor presented here if something could be said in response to this way of 
justifying the Laser.
To that end, I think supporters of the Razor can first legitimately raise doubts 
about the idea that the Laser is really as directly intuitive as it perhaps appears to 
be. Isn’t it possible that what supporters of the Laser really find intuitive is that non-
fundamentals entities are ontologically innocent, or that it is theoretically virtuous to 
explain things wherever possible, etc., and that they claim to find the Laser directly 
intuitive simply because they are (perhaps implicitly) convinced of the arguments 
from these sorts of claims to the Laser? If this is right, then what I’ve done here in 
showing that the Razor is consistent with the ontological innocence of non-funda-
mental entities (§2.2), and with the thought that it is theoretically virtuous to explain 
things wherever possible (§3.2), and more generally in finding fault with arguments 
for the Laser from apparently intuitively true premises, is to show that there is no 
intuitive grounding for the Laser after all.
That said, supporters of the Razor ultimately need not rely on the claim that 
no-one really finds the Laser directly intuitive (and so they need not worry about 
recalcitrant supporters of the Laser who insist that they find it to be an intui-
tive principle independently of considerations of ontological innocence, etc.). For 
they can retreat to the defence that, whilst some philosophers may well find the 
Laser to be directly intuitive, there’s evidence that other philosophers think that 
it’s the Razor that is the intuitively correct principle. After all, if the existence of 
arguments for the Laser counts as prima facie evidence that the authors of those 
arguments find the Laser to be directly intuitive, then the existence of defences 
of the Razor against those arguments (including that of this paper), as well as of 
positive arguments for accepting the Razor over the Laser (see Baron & Tallant, 
2018: 603ff. Da Vee, 2020: §3), should similarly count as prima facie evidence 
that the authors of those arguments find the Razor to be directly intuitive. We 
18 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point, and indeed for encouraging me to discuss this way of 
arguing for the Laser in the first place.
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seem to have no reason, then, for thinking that there’s any more intuitive support 
for the Laser than there is for the Razor.19
So the extant arguments for the Laser fail, and consideration of the alleged 
bare intuitiveness of the Laser doesn’t seem to tip the scales in its favour either. 
I conclude that we currently have no reason to replace the Razor with the Laser.
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